LarrunKonnect

Network security, no blind spots.

A community radio network shouldn't be an act of faith. Here's exactly what LarrunKonnect encrypts, what's exposed, and what an attacker — friendly or not — can actually attempt.

The framework — the C·I·A triad

Three properties to uphold, all at once.

In cybersecurity, a system isn't judged on "is it secure" but on three independent axes. Here's where LarrunKonnect stands on each one.

C
No one reads it

Confidentiality

AES-256-CTR encryption per channel, pre-shared keys. The NIST standard used by banks and defense agencies.

LEVELVery strong
I
No one tampers with it

Integrity

Sequence numbers, timestamps, packet hash checked at every hop. A tampered message is rejected.

LEVELStrong
A
The network holds up

Availability

Redundant multi-hop routing, regulated duty cycle. Vulnerable to powerful radio jamming — like any RF system.

LEVELModerate to strong
01 — Confidentiality

AES-256, the industry standard.

Every LarrunKonnect channel (for example FAMILLE-AZK) is protected by a symmetric key, AES-256 in CTR mode. It's the algorithm chosen by NIST (FIPS 197), used by banks, by the US military for documents classified TOP SECRET, TLS 1.3, WPA3, Signal, and iMessage.

To brute-force an AES-256 key, you would need to try up to 2256 ≈ 1.16 × 1077 combinations. At 1018 attempts per second (the power of an exascale supercomputer dedicated solely to this task), it would take 3.7 × 1051 years — that's 1041 times the age of the universe.

Even quantum cryptanalysis (Grover's algorithm) only reduces the effective security to 128 bits, which remains out of reach for at least the next century.

The weak link

Modern cryptography isn't broken — it's bypassed. The only realistic way to intercept a LarrunKonnect message is to steal the key: scanning the QR code, gaining access to the paired phone, a shared screenshot. Guard your key like a set of house keys.

● KEY SPACE · AES-256
2^256 combinationsYOUR KEY1 in 10⁷⁷
Finding the key at random ≈
3.7 × 1051 years of computation

Anatomy of an encrypted LoRa packet

Preamble
8 sym
Sync
2 bytes
From
4 bytes
PacketID
4 bytes
AES-256-CTR encrypted payload
≤ 230 bytes
CRC
2 bytes
Encrypted: the message content, unreadable without the key.
In the clear (metadata): source address and packet identifier — needed for routing.
Radio frame: sync preamble and CRC, common to every LoRa transmission.
02 — Availability

Can the network be shut down?

JAMMING

Saturating the 868 MHz band

A powerful transmitter can locally prevent nodes from hearing each other. It's the radio equivalent of a DDoS.

LoRa RESISTANCE
+17 dB of gain
vs. classic FSK
LEGAL?
No — up to 6 months in prison
Art. L.39-1 CPCE (French law)
FLOOD · DENIAL OF SERVICE

Flooding the mesh with packets

A rogue node transmitting continuously can hog the airtime and overwhelm neighbours' queues.

EU DUTY CYCLE
1% max / hour
ETSI EN 300 220
PACKETS WITHOUT A VALID KEY
Dropped without CPU cost
hardware filter
Structural advantage
Unlike a centralised carrier, there's no "tower" to bring down. Jamming one node only affects its immediate range. The mesh will route around it as long as a hop-by-hop path remains.
Field test at altitude — active Meshtastic node on a Pyrenean ridge
FIELD TEST · RIDGE · NETWORK ACTIVE WITH NO INFRASTRUCTURE
03 — Integrity

Can a message be altered or replayed?

Replay Attack

An attacker captures "Open the gate" and replays it later. Without protection, the gate would open.

✓ Unique 32-bit PacketID
✓ 5-minute deduplication cache
✓ Timestamp checked

Fake message injection

Forging a message that appears to come from another node on the channel.

✓ Without the AES key, the payload is unreadable
✓ Decryption produces noise ⇒ rejected
✓ Implicit MAC via CTR mode + ID
04 — Attack surface

Every attack vector, laid bare.

Our RedTeam approach: nothing hidden. Here are the seven known attacks against a Meshtastic network, their real risk for LarrunKonnect, and the mitigation.

ATTACKDESCRIPTIONRISKMITIGATION
JammingA powerful transmitter that saturates the 868 MHz band, preventing nodes from hearing each other.ModerateLoRa CSS is very noise-resistant (~17 dB of processing gain). A jammer is easily triangulated. Illegal (ARCEP — Art. L.39-1 CPCE).
Denial of service (Flood)Massive packet injection to saturate the queue or the airtime.LowA 1% duty cycle enforced by the ETSI EN 300 220 standard. Packets without a valid key are dropped without CPU cost.
Malicious node (Black Hole)A node appears to relay traffic but silently drops the packets.LowFlooding-based routing: every message tries several paths. A missing ACK ⇒ retransmission by other neighbours.
Sybil AttackA single device creates dozens of fake identities to distort routing.LowA small local network (3–50 nodes), routing table capped at 100 entries (NodeDB).
Replay AttackCapturing a legitimate message and replaying it later to trigger an action.Very low32-bit PacketID + a 5-minute deduplication cache in the firmware.
TDoA triangulationSeveral SDR receivers measure the time difference of arrival to locate a transmitter.Real (for a specific target)Disable GPS sharing, degrade the precision (1 km zone), randomise the transmission interval.
Key compromiseTheft of the channel QR code, physical access to the paired phone, a published screenshot.RealThe human link. Periodic key rotation, separate channels by use, biometric lock on the app.
05 — In perspective

An honest comparison with what we use every day.

TECHNOLOGYE2E ENCRYPTIONIDENTIFICATIONANONYMITYOFFLINENOTE
Carrier SMSNoSIM/IMSIIdentifiableNoSent in the clear over SS7
WhatsApp / SignalYes (Signal Protocol)Phone numberMetadata held by the carrierNoDepends on the Internet
LarrunKonnect (Meshtastic)Yes (AES-256-CTR)Channel keyNo SIM, no linked IMEIYesRadio metadata visible locally
Verdict

The Offensive Security take.

LarrunKonnect, built on Meshtastic and LoRa, is cryptographically stronger than an SMS (which travels in the clear over SS7), more resilient than the Internet in the face of a targeted outage, and more privacy-respecting than a "free" app that harvests your contact list.

It isn't a tool for discussing state secrets — it was never meant to be. It's a local, low-key tool, whose security is legible: everything is documented, the code is open, the trade-offs are named. No black box, no marketing promises.

"The best security is the kind you understand."